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State income tax statutes define residency and provide the 
rules for taxation of a state resident.  In most states, 
maintenance of a domicile in the state is sufficient, by itself, for 
taxation as a resident without regard to any other test.  
Unfortunately, rather than applying a set of easily measurable 
objective tests to meet this domicile standard, the state taxing 
authorities instead simply think they know it when they see it.  
Unfortunately, they do not and neither do taxpayers.  Such an 
attitude is reminiscent of the concurring opinion of Justice 
Potter Stewart, who, when struggling with the definition of 
obscenity gave us the famous quote: ”I know it when I see it.”1  
While this type of judicial reasoning may be entirely appropriate 
in obscenity disputes, state definitions of “resident” for personal 
income tax purposes need not and should not resort to similar 
subjective standards. 
The current domicile standard often requires a look into 
the intent of the taxpayer when determining domicile and the 
resulting tax liability.2  Better options exist for an important 
standard crucial to the proper computation of tax liability and 
the integrity and administration of our state individual income 
tax systems.  The current domicile standard has resulted in 
 
1.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
2.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 1(f) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.01(7) 
(2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b) (McKinney 2019). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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uncertain, inconsistent, time-consuming, and invasive audits.  
The time has come to end these corrosive we-know-it-when-we-
see-it audits that have eroded the confidence of taxpayers and 
created inefficiencies in tax administration. States should 
reconsider their laws in furtherance of sound tax policy. 
This Article argues that states should remove the domicile 
concept from the definition of a resident and rely solely on an 
objective test or tests. Part I of this Article defines the terms 
resident and domicile using examples from the laws of 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York.  Part II discusses the 
problems created for individuals and state taxing authorities in 
the application of a subjective standard, the burden and 
standard of proof applied, and the domicile or residency bias of 
states.  Part III describes how Congress defines a resident of the 
United States and the rationale behind Congress’s movement 
away from its previous subjective standard.  Using tax policy 
maxims, Part IV concludes by supporting a shift away from the 
current use of the subjective domicile standard and a 
modification of state tax laws to more closely follow the federal 
income tax definition of a resident. 
 
I.  Current Law in Many States 
 
The laws of Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York, 
described in this Part of the Article, illustrate the importance of 
the residency determination, provide the definitions of resident 
and domicile, and demonstrate state efforts to demystify the 
definition of domicile using objective factors. This Article will 
use these three states to illustrate the difficulties associated 
with the domicile test for residency. 
 
A. Why Residency Matters 
 
Forty-three states impose a personal income tax.3  Forty-
one states tax most income earned by an individual.4  Two states, 
 
3.  Morgan Scarboro, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 
2018, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-individual-
income-tax-rates-brackets-2018/. 
4.  Id. 
3
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New Hampshire and Tennessee, limit their personal income tax 
to dividend and interest income.5  In determining its tax base, a 
state may constitutionally tax the worldwide income of a state 
resident.6  However, the U.S. Constitution limits the taxation of 
nonresidents to income sourced to that particular state.7  In 
compliance with this constitutional mandate, states have 
drafted statutes and regulations defining nonresident source 
income that falls within the permissible tax base. 
Massachusetts imposes tax on a nonresident’s income 
derived from or effectively connected with: 
 
(1) [A]ny trade or business, including any 
employment, carried on by [the taxpayer] in 
Massachusetts . . . 
(2) [T]he participation in any lottery or wagering 
transaction in Massachusetts; or 
(3) [T]he ownership of any interest in real or 
tangible personal property located in 
Massachusetts.8 
 
In Minnesota, nonresident individuals initially compute 
their taxable income the same way that residents do.9  After 
applying the rate to get a tax liability, and subtracting 
nonrefundable credits, nonresidents apportion the tax itself 
according to the ratio that Minnesota-source federal adjusted 
gross income bears to total federal adjusted gross income.10  In 
the calculation of the numerator of its fraction, the state 
definition of Minnesota–source federal adjusted gross income 
includes: 
 
 Wages, salaries, fees, commissions, tips or 
bonuses for work done in Minnesota 
 
5.  Id. 
6.  See generally New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937). 
7.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 
57 (1920). 
8.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 5A (2018); 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(2) 
(2018). 
9.  MINN. STAT. § 290.06 subdiv. 2c(e) (2018). 
10.  § 290.06 subdiv. 2c(e)(1) . 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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 Gross winnings from gambling in Minnesota 
 Gross rents and royalties from Minnesota 
property 
 Gains from the sale of land or other tangible 
property in Minnesota 
 Gains from the sale of a partnership interest 
that had property or sales in Minnesota 
 Gains on the sale of goodwill or income from a 
“non-compete” agreement connected with a 
business operating in Minnesota 
 Minnesota gross income from a business or 
profession conducted partly or entirely in 
Minnesota, including any Minnesota gross 
income received as a shareholder of an S 
corporation or as a partner of a partnership11 
 
Similar to Minnesota law, New York law requires that 
nonresidents compute their tax as if they were residents and 
then prorate the tax based on the ratio of New 
York source income to all income.12  In the calculation of the 
numerator of its fraction, the state definition of New York-source 
income includes: 
 
 [R]eal or tangible personal property located in 
New York State, (including certain gains or 
losses from the sale or exchange of an interest 
in an entity that owns real property in New 
York State . . . ; 
 [S]ervices performed in New York State; 
 [A] business, trade, profession, or occupation 
carried on in New York State; 
 [D]istributive share of New York State 
partnership income or gain; 
 New York State estate or trust income or gain; 
 New York State Lottery winnings if the total 
 
11.  MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, INCOME TAX FACT SHEET 3: NONRESIDENTS 
(2018), https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/individuals/individ_income/factsheet 
s/fact_sheets_fs3.pdf. 
12.  N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(e) (McKinney 2019). 
5
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proceeds of the prize are more than $5,000 . . .; 
 [A]ny gain from the sale, transfer, or other 
disposition of shares of stock in a cooperative 
housing corporation in connection with the 
grant or transfer of a proprietary leasehold, 
when the real property comprising the units of 
the cooperative housing corporation is located 
in New York State; 
 [A]ny income . . . received related to a 
business, trade, profession, or occupation 
previously carried on in New York State, 
including but not limited to covenants not to 
compete and termination agreements . . . ; and 
 [Income from] a New York S corporation in 
which you are a shareholder, including: 
 [A]ny gain recognized on the receipt of 
payments from an installment 
obligation for federal income tax 
purposes where the S corporation has 
distributed an installment obligation 
under IRC section 453(h)(1)(A) to the 
shareholders; 
 [A]ny gain recognized on the deemed 
asset sale for federal income tax 
purposes where the S corporation has 
made an election under IRC section 
338(h)(10); and 
 [A]ny income or gain recognized on the 
receipt of payments from an installment 
sale contract entered into when the S 
corporation was subject to tax in 
New York in a case where the S 
corporation terminates its taxable 
status in New York.13 
 
 
13.   N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF TAX’N AND FIN., NEW YORK SOURCE INCOME OF 
NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS, ESTATES, AND TRUSTS, AND PART-YEAR RESIDENT 
INDIVIDUALS AND TRUSTS 1 (2011), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/tg_bulletins/pit/ 
b11_615i.pdf. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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Although these states apply different formulae for reaching 
the tax base of nonresidents, each state attempts to limit the 
taxation of nonresidents to income earned within its borders.  
Because a residency determination results in the imposition of 
tax on worldwide income, such a determination substantially 
broadens the tax base of resident individuals that have earned 
income within and without their resident jurisdiction. 
 
B. When Residency Disputes Arise 
 
Residency disputes often arise when taxpayers move into 
or out of a state and the taxpayer disagrees with the government 
with respect to residency status.  Between 1989 and 1998, New 
York conducted over 30,000 residency audits and assessments 
from these New York residency audits exceeded $1 billion.14 
When things go well and no dispute arises, the residency 
state taxes the worldwide income of the resident and grants a 
credit to the taxpayer for taxes paid on income sourced to the 
nonresident state.15  This credit often avoids or substantially 
reduces the taxation of the same income in the resident and 
nonresident state. 
Occasionally, where a taxpayer meets the residency test of 
two states with a personal income tax, the situation becomes 
more complicated.  Although we may hope for a constitutional 
limitation on state taxation in this situation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has upheld the taxation by two or more states as residents 
in the estate tax context and the logic would likely apply in the 
income tax area.16  Fortunately, when two states claim 
residency, that individual generally finds relief through the 
credit mechanism described above that grants a credit for taxes 
paid to the other state.  Similar to the credit granted residents 
for tax paid to nonresident jurisdictions, the credit mechanism 
 
14.  Paul R. Comeau & Andrew B. Sabol, Multistate Residency Issues: 
Might Regional Uniformity Be Applied Nationwide?, 7 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & 
INCENTIVES 272, 273 (1998). 
15.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(a) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.06 
subdiv. 22a (2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 620(a) (McKinney 2019). 
16.  See generally Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Worcester Cty. Trust 
Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937). 
7
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often eliminates a duplication of tax on the same income.17 
A move from a taxing state to a state with no personal 
income tax often produces a large tax disparity and may receive 
more attention from the states.  The former resident state would 
like to continue to tax the individual as a resident giving that 
state access to a tax base that includes the individual’s 
worldwide income.  Successful abandonment of residency in the 
former state of residence, assuming no income sourced to the 
former resident state, leaves the former resident state with no 
tax base.  Therefore, establishing a residency change from a 
taxing state to a state with no personal income tax can eliminate 
state personal income tax in its entirety.  Because Florida is both 
a retirement destination and a state with no personal income 
tax,18 retirees headed for Florida from states with a personal 
income tax provide an excellent illustration of the tax at stake. 
To quantify the amount at stake in a move to a no-tax 
state,19 a taxpayer can estimate the savings by multiplying the 
former residence state’s taxable income by the marginal rate in 
that state.  Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York have tax 
rates of 5.1 percent,20 9.85 percent,21 and 8.82 percent,22 
respectively.23  Due to their higher tax rates, high-tax states, 
including the three States discussed in this Article, face greater 
revenue pressures due to the migration of individuals from 
higher-tax to lower-tax states.  A Cato Institute study concluded 
that tax rates influence interstate migration flows.24  In 2016, 
 
17.  See Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes 
to Eliminate the Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the 
Proposed Minnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533 (2014) (discussing 
the credit mechanism and when that mechanism does not work perfectly for 
dual resident taxpayers). 
18.  FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (prohibiting a personal income tax).   
19.  Assuming no income sourced to the former residence jurisdiction. 
20.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 4(a) (2018). 
21.  MINN. STAT. § 290.06 subdiv. 2c (2018) (2019 highest marginal tax 
rate). 
22.  N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(a)(1)(B)(ii) (McKinney 2019) (2019 highest 
marginal tax rate). 
23.  See Jason Notte, How Much Can You Save by Moving to a Low-Tax 
State?, ST. (Mar. 28, 2018, 9:37 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/1452322 
2/1/how-much-can-you-save-by-moving-to-a-low-tax-state.html (discussing 
calculation of savings from move to a no-tax state). 
24.  CHRIS EDWARDS, TAX & BUDGET BULLETIN: TAX REFORM AND 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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almost 600,000 people with aggregate income of $33 billion 
moved, on net, from the twenty-five highest-tax states to the 
twenty-five lowest-tax states in that single year.25  Of the 
twenty-five highest-tax states, twenty-four of them had net out-
migration in 2016.26  Of the twenty-five lowest-tax states, 
seventeen had net in-migration.27  The largest out-migration is 
from high-tax New York, whereas the largest in-migration is to 
low-tax Florida.28  Due to the guidance provided by various 
popular internet resources, the migration to Florida may not 
surprise many.  Potentially accelerating the move to Florida, 
numerous tax professionals have advertised their expertise in 
domicile changes to low-tax states.29 
The states seem to have noticed this migration and the 
publicity surrounding the migration.  Although states do not 
publish their targeting methodology for residency examinations, 
there are a wealth of examples from practitioners who have 
noted that Departments of Revenue seem to have an abundance 
of Florida retiree audits.30 These retirees can become 
particularly attractive audit targets when they recognize a large 
capital gain after their purported change of residency.  If the 
states succeed in classifying these taxpayers as residents in the 
year of capital gain recognition, it may tax their entire gain.31  In 
the absence of a successful residency claim, Massachusetts, 
 
INTERSTATE MIGRATION 1 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/fi 
les/pubs/pdf/tbb-84-revised.pdf. 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29. See, e.g., Sandra Block, et al., 10 Most Tax-Friendly States for Retirees, 
2018, KIPLINGER (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.kiplinger.com/slidesho 
w/retirement/T037-S001-10-most-tax-friendly-states-for-retirees-2018/index.h 
tml; Patrick Kiger, Which States Provide the Best Tax Breaks for Retirees?, 
AARP (June 5, 2017), https://www.aarp.org/money/taxes/info-2017/states-best-
tax-breaks-retirees-fd.html. 
30.  See, e.g., John H. Gadon, et al., Home is Where the House is—or is It?, 
PRACTICAL TAX LAWYER, Spring 2012, at 12; Susan B. Garland, States 
Targeting Snowbirds Fleeing to Tax-Friendlier Climates, KIPLINGER (Feb. 
2016), https://kiplinger.com/article/retirement/T055-C000-S004-home-is-wher 
e-the-tax-haven-is.html. 
31.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 4(a) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.014 
subdiv. 1; N.Y. TAX LAW § 601 (McKinney 2019). 
9
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Minnesota, and New York nonresidents escape taxation on gains 
from the sale or exchange of intangibles not derived from or 
effectively connected with the carrying on of a trade or business 
in the state.32  Therefore, residents of the three states 
recognizing large capital gains from intangible sales avoid tax if 
they successfully abandon their residency in the taxing state for 
a state without a personal income tax.  In its instructions to its 
auditors, New York announced its intent to target individuals 
with large capital gain recognition shortly after their residency 
change.33  Therefore, to properly file and plan for state personal 
income tax liabilities, taxpayers must understand the varying 
definitions of domicile and resident. 
 
C. Definition of Resident 
 
As stated above, state income tax statutes provide the 
definition of a resident and the consequences of that 
determination.  Despite the utilization of different tests for 
determining residency status, domicile in the state results in 
taxation as a resident, without regard to any other test, in most 
states and the District of Columbia. 
When defining a “resident,” many states follow a rule 
similar to that of Massachusetts.  Massachusetts defines a 
“resident” for tax purposes in the following manner: 
 
(1) [A]ny natural person domiciled in the 
commonwealth, or (2) any natural person who is 
not domiciled in the commonwealth but who 
maintains a permanent place of abode in the 
commonwealth and spends in the aggregate more 
than one hundred eighty-three days of the taxable 
year  in the  commonwealth, including  days  spent 
 
 
32.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 5A(a) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.17(2)(c) 
(2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 631(b)(2) (McKinney 2019). 
33.  STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF TAX’N AND FIN., NONRESIDENT AUDIT 
GUIDELINES 84 (2014), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/2014/misc/nonresident_audi 
t_guidelines_2014.pdf (directing the department’s auditors to pay special 
attention to taxpayers who recognize large capital gains “immediately” after a 
reported change of domicile). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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partially in and partially out of the 
commonwealth.34 
 
In Minnesota, the term “resident” includes any individual 
domiciled in Minnesota and any individual domiciled outside the 
state who maintains a place of abode in the state and spends in 
the aggregate more than one-half of the tax year in Minnesota.35 
Similarly, New York defines a resident as one who: 
 
(A) [I]s domiciled in [New York]; or (B) is not 
domiciled in [New York] but maintains a 
permanent place of abode in this state and spends 
in the aggregate more than one hundred eighty-
three days of the taxable year in this state, unless 
such individual is in active service in the armed 
forces of the United States.36 
 
Like many other states with a personal income tax, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York have another 
opportunity to catch taxpayers in their residency webs by 
finding residency based on a mere count of days present in the 
taxing state.37  Although the states vary the number of days of 
presence required, most states treat 183 days as sufficient for 
residency.38  Of the states employing this alternative test, many 
also require that the taxpayer have a permanent place of abode 
in the state.39  Rooted in an objective count of days, this “days 
test” rarely creates the taxpayer angst that often follows a 
subjective domicile determination, and the states find it easier 
to enforce.40  For that reason, this Article focuses on the domicile 
 
34.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 1(f) (2018). 
35.  MINN. STAT. § 290.01 subdiv. 7 (2018). 
36.  N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b) (McKinney 2019). 
37.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 1(f) (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.01 
subdiv. 7(b) (2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(1)(A) (McKinney 2019). 
38.  MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, RESIDENCY REPORT 6–8 (2015), 
https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats/Documents/Residency_Repor
t_03_13_15.pdf. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Edward A. Zelinsky, Defining Residence for Income Tax Purposes:  
Domicile as Gap-Filler, Citizenship as Proxy and Gap-Filler, 38 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 271 (2017). 
11
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test employed by the states and argues for its removal from the 
definition of resident.  Instead, the “days test,” or a modified 
version of that test, would constitute an appropriate 
replacement for the domicile standard. 
 
D. Definition of Domicile 
 
1. History of the Law of Domicile 
 
The word “domicile,” derived from the Latin domus 
meaning a home or dwelling place, dates back to the Roman 
Empire.41  Roman law recognized a connection between a person 
and her community known as domicile.42  Under Roman law, an 
individual could acquire and abandon a domicile provided that 
individual had an intention to do so and accompanied that 
intention with presence.43 
English common law addressed the definition of domicile 
as early as 1820 in Munroe v. Douglas.44  The Court declared, 
“[a]n acquired domicil is not lost by mere abandonment, but 
continues until a subsequent domicil is acquired . . .”45  Later, in 
Udny v. Udny, Lord Westbury further defined domicile: 
 
Domicil of choice is a conclusion or inference 
which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing 
voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a 
particular place, with an intention of continuing 
to reside there for an unlimited time. This is a 
description of the circumstances which create or 
constitute a domicil, and not a definition of the 
term. There must be a residence freely chosen, 
and not prescribed or dictated by any external 
necessity, such as the duties of office, the demands 
of creditors, or the relief from illness; and it must 
be residence fixed not for a limited period or 
 
41.  25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicil § 1 (2012); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 3 (2004). 
42.  M.W. JACOBS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMICIL 3, 7–11 (1887). 
43.  Id. at 7. 
44.  Munroe v. Douglas (1820) 56 Eng. Rep 940. 
45.  Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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particular purpose, but general and indefinite in 
its future contemplation.46  
 
In 1853, a state law case reached the U.S. in Dupuy v. 
Wurtz.47  There, the New York Court of Appeals faced questions 
concerning the validity of a will made by a testatrix, originally 
domiciled in New York.48  She went abroad in 1859 for health 
reasons and remained abroad until her death in 1871.49  In 
deciding that the testatrix had retained a New York domicile, 
the court established early U.S. concepts of domicile.  The Court 
opined that every person must have a domicile, can have but one 
domicile, and that domicile continues until a new one is 
acquired.50  In addition, a change of domicile required not only a 
change of residence, but also an intention to abandon the former 
domicile and acquire another as the sole domicile.51 
Matter of Newcomb presented the New York courts with 
another interesting domicile issue.52  After reaching the age of 
eighty, Mrs. Newcomb, a domiciliary of New York, decided to 
move to New Orleans where she had established a memorial 
monument for her daughter.53  In anticipation of a domicile 
question, she executed several formal declarations, in one of 
which she said: 
 
I have now concluded to make my permanent 
home here, because on each succeeding day of my 
life now drawing to a close, I am the grateful 
witness of the successful development and steady 
growth of this noble institution (referring to the 
Memorial College), which now engrosses my 
thoughts and purposes and is endeared to me by 
such hallowed associations. In order that there 
may be no occasion for misapprehension 
 
46.  Udny v. Udny (1869) 1 Sc. & Div. 441, 458 (Scot.). 
47.  53 N.Y. 556 (1873). 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. at 558. 
50.  Id. at 561. 
51.  Id. at 561; 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicil § 1 (2012). 
52.  See generally In re Estate of Newcomb, 84 N.E. 950 (N.Y. 1908). 
53.  Id. at 952–53. 
13
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hereafter, especially in any matter touching the 
settlement of my estate, I desire to have it known 
by my particular friends that I have elected to 
make the city of New Orleans my place of domicile 
and permanent home, although of course I may 
occasionally visit or reside in other places.54 
 
The Court held such declarations admissible as evidence of 
her intent as to domicile.55  It also noted “a person may have two 
places of residence, as in the city and country, but only one 
domicile.”56  Echoing the definitions of domicile discussed above, 
the Court defined domicile as “living in that locality with the 
intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.”57  The Court 
ultimately found for the taxpayer and her intent to establish a 
domicile in New Orleans.58  A review of the days spent in New 
York City and New Orleans leads readers to believe that the 
Court must have placed great weight on her declaration of 
domicile.  Between the date of the declaration and her date of 
death, she spent less than 150 days in New Orleans and more 
than 500 in New York City.59 
In 1914, a domicile case reached the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Williamson v. Osenton.60  There, the Plaintiff moved from 
West Virginia to Virginia and brought a suit in Virginia for 
divorce.61  The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s jurisdiction 
remained in West Virginia (the same as Defendant), thus the 
requisite diversity of citizenship did not exist.62  In finding for 
the Plaintiff, the Court relied on a stipulation of facts that the 
Plaintiff went to Virginia “with the intention of making her 
home in that state for an indefinite time in order that she might 
institute this suit against the defendant in the United States 
 
54.  Id. at 953. 
55.  Id. at 955. 
56.  Id. at 954. 
57.  Id. 
58.  In re Estate of Newcomb, 84 N.E. at 954. 
59.  Id. at 953. 
60.  See generally 232 U.S. 619 (1914). 
61.  Id. at 623. 
62.  Id. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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court.”63  Justice Holmes defined domicile as “. . . the technically 
pre-eminent headquarters that every person is compelled to 
have in order that certain rights and duties that have been 
attached to it by the law may be determined.”64  In resolving the 
case before him, a purported change of domicile, Justice Holmes 
stated, “[t]he essential fact that raises change of abode to change 
of domicil is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere.”65 
In 1971, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws stated, 
“[a] person’s domicil is usually the place where he has his 
home.”66  Home, in turn, is “the place where a person dwells and 
which is the center of his domestic, social and civil life.”67 
From Roman law through the Second Restatement: 
Conflict of Laws, domicile determined many of the rights and 
obligations of the parties, the characterization of property, the 
validity and construction of a will, the place of probate, and other 
issues.  In constructing their definitions of domicile for tax 
purposes, states followed a similar path. 
 
2. Domicile in State Tax Law 
 
As described below, state tax definitions of domicile remain 
consistent with Roman law, common law, early U.S. law outside 
of the tax context, and the definitions provided in the Second 
Restatement. 
In 1840, Massachusetts faced a tax domicile question in 
Thorndike v. City of Boston.68 A Boston citizen had moved out of 
the country but kept his mansion in the city anticipating his 
wife’s return after his death.69  The taxpayer never intended to 
move back to the city.70  Boston believed that the taxpayer, still 
a domiciliary, owed poll tax and a tax on personal property.71  In 
 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. at 625 (citing Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 
154, 157 (1898)). 
65.  Williamson, 232 U.S. at 625. 
66.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 1971). 
67.  Id. § 12. 
68.  42 Mass. 242 (1840). 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. 
15
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ruling in favor of the taxpayer, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court made the following statement about domicile: 
 
No exact definition can be given of domicil; it 
depends upon no one fact or combination of 
circumstances, but from the whole taken together 
it must be determined in each particular case.  It 
is a maxim, that every man must have a domicil 
somewhere; and also that he can have but one.  Of 
course it follows, that his existing domicil 
continues until he acquires another; and vice 
versâ, by acquiring a new domicil, he relinquishes 
his former one.  From this view it is manifest that 
very slight circumstances must often decide the 
question.  It depends upon the preponderance of 
the evidence in favor of two or more places; and it 
may often occur, that the evidence of facts tending 
to establish the domicil in one place, would be 
entirely conclusive, were it not for the existence of 
facts and circumstances of a still more conclusive 
and decisive character, which fix it, beyond 
question, in another.  So on the contrary, very 
slight circumstances may fix one’s domicil, if not 
controlled by more conclusive facts fixing it in 
another place.  If a seaman, without family or 
property, sails from the place of his nativity, 
which may be considered his domicil of origin, 
although he may return only at long intervals, or 
even be absent many years, yet if he does not by 
some actual residence or other means acquire a 
domicil elsewhere, he retains his domicil of 
origin.72 
 
In 1933, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
addressed a personal income tax matter in Commonwealth v. 
Davis.73  The Plaintiff, Davis, argued that he had moved from 
Massachusetts to Texas and the assertion of the personal income 
 
72.  Id. at 245–46. 
73.  187 N.E. 33, 37 (Mass. 1933). 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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tax violated both the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitution.74  
The Court first noted the following: 
 
It is difficult if not impracticable to give a 
definition of domicil at once accurate and 
comprehensive.  It commonly depends upon no 
one fact or combination of circumstances but 
upon all the factors disclosed in the particular 
case.  In general it is said to be the place of actual 
residence with intention to remain permanently 
or for an indefinite time and without any certain 
purpose to return to a former place of abode.75 
 
After reviewing the facts in Davis, the court made the following 
finding: 
 
The fact that he made no change in his method of 
living, the relative attractiveness to him of 
Brockton and Luling as places of abode, the small 
amount of time spent and the meagre personal 
belongings left in the latter place, and the 
evidence as to his philanthropic, social and family 
interests, the various reasons for the change put 
forward from time to time and the very 
elaborateness of his formal public announcements 
on the subject, all might have been regarded as 
negativing, or at least as failing to prove, a change 
of domicil.76 
 
In 1956, keeping with history, Massachusetts promulgated 
personal income tax regulations that defined domicile as “the 
place that is an individual’s true, fixed, and permanent home, 
determined by established common law principles and the facts 
and circumstances of each case.”77  More recently, in Reiersen v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, the taxpayer claimed he maintained 
 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 38. 
77.  830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(2) (2018). 
17
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a domicile in the Republic of the Philippines and earned his 
entire income from sources in that country.78  The Court 
determined that Reiersen had found in the Philippines, business 
and social success he had not enjoyed in Massachusetts.79  
Reiersen had made friends and joined clubs.80 The Court also 
called his family connections “distant.”81  The Court 
acknowledged his expressions of intent to establish domicile in 
the Philippines and found that intent reinforced by objective 
evidence offered at trial.82  The Court ruled, “the subsidiary facts 
found by the board require a conclusion that Reiersen had a 
present and future intent during the years in issue to make the 
Philippines his home and the center of his business, social, and 
civic life.”83 
Minnesota’s rules similarly define domicile as: 
 
The bodily presence of an individual person in a 
place coupled with an intent to make such a place 
one’s home.  The domicile of any person is that 
place in which that person’s habitation is fixed, 
without any present intentions of removal 
therefrom, and to which, whenever absent, that 
person intends to return. 
. . . . 
The mere intention to acquire a new domicile, 
without physical removal, does not change the 
status of the taxpayer, nor does the fact of 
physical removal, without the intention to remain, 
change the person’s status.84 
 
An individual can have only one domicile at any particular 
time and that domicile, once shown to exist, continues until the 
 
78.  524 N.E.2d 857, 857 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988). 
79.  Id. at 860–61. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Reiersen, 524 N.E.2d at 861 (citing Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El 
Comandante, 598 F.2d 698, 700–03 (1st Cir. 1979)); Leavitt v. Scott, 338 F.2d 
749, 751 (10th Cir. 1964). 
84.  MINN. R. 8001.0300(2) (2019). 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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taxpayer abandons that domicile.85  “An absence of intention to 
abandon a domicile is equivalent to an intention to retain the 
existing one.”86 
In Larson v. Commissioner,87 the taxpayer: 
 
[O]wned more property in Minnesota than he did 
in Nevada, spent more time in Minnesota than he 
did in Nevada, registered more vehicles in 
Minnesota than Nevada, and maintained bank 
accounts and mail delivery in Minnesota. 
Larson also maintained other personal and 
professional connections in Minnesota that he did 
not have in Nevada.88 
 
Larson used attorneys, accountants, and personal assistants in 
both jurisdictions during the tax years.89  Larson did not prove 
that he intended to change his domicile to Nevada.90  The Court 
not only looked at Larson’s stated intent and his actions in the 
tax years, but also looked at the “acts and circumstances” of 
Larson’s life thereafter to evaluate “the sincerity of [his] 
announced intent.”91 
New York defines domicile as “the place which an 
individual intends to be such individual’s permanent home—the 
place to which such individual intends to return whenever such 
individual may be absent.”92  Once established, that domicile 
continues until the individual in question moves to a new 
location with the bona fide intention of establishing a new fixed 
and permanent home.93  No change of domicile results from a 
removal to a new location if the taxpayer intends to remain there 
only for a limited time.94  A person can have only one domicile 
 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  824 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. 2013). 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 333. 
92.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(1) (2019). 
93.  § 105.20(d)(2). 
94.  Id. 
19
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and if a person has two or more homes, such person’s domicile is 
the one which such person regards and uses as such person’s 
permanent home.95 
In 1943, the New York Court of Appeals measured an 
individual’s intent to create a new domicile by considering 
“whether the place of habitation is the permanent home of a 
person, with the range of sentiment, feeling and permanent 
association with it.”96  With regard to an alleged change of 
domicile, courts have found formal declarations less persuasive 
than the informal acts of an individual’s “general habit of life.”97 
Although New York auditors may focus on objective factors 
to make their assessments, New York courts have found in favor 
of taxpayers that provided the court with compelling testimony 
as to their subjective domicile intent.98  In Matter of Patrick, the 
taxpayer returned to New York to marry his long lost love from 
40 years earlier, Clara.99  After experiencing some medical 
issues, he separated from his wife at that time to begin his 
search for Clara.100  He found Clara again in 2008.101  In 2009, 
Clara and the taxpayer finalized their divorces to their spouses 
and married.102  On March 1, 2011, the taxpayer retired and 
joined Clara in Paris.103  The taxpayer sought permanent 
residency in France, obtained a French driver’s license, and 
became a world traveler with Clara.104  He purchased and 
extensively renovated a Paris home and changed his lifestyle.105  
Despite these changes, the taxpayer spent roughly twice as 
many days in New York as he spent in Paris in both 2011 and 
 
95.  § 105.20(d)(4). 
96.  In re Estate of Bourne, 41 N.Y.S.2d 336, 343 (1943), aff’d, 47 N.Y.S.2d 
134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944), and aff’d, 58 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1944) (citation 
omitted). 
97.  See, e.g., In re Trowbridge, 194 N.E. 756, 758 (N.Y. 1935). 
98.  See, e.g., In re Patrick, DTA Nos. 826838 and 826839 (N.Y. Div. of Tax 
App. 2017). 
99.  Id. at 5. 
100.  Id. at 4. 
101.  Id. at 5. 
102.  Id. at 7. 
103.  Id. at 9. 
104.  In re Patrick, DTA Nos. 826838 and 826839, at 11. 
105.  Id. at 8. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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2012.106  His need for certain surgical procedure expertise in 
New York, contributed to his New York presence for these two 
years.107  The auditor concluded that the taxpayer’s home, active 
business, family, “near and dear” items, and time spent in each 
location favored a finding of New York domicile.108  The 
administrative law judge found that the taxpayer’s “credible 
testimony in this regard was unequivocal” and that he 
“considered Paris his home.”109 
In an attempt to assist taxpayers and auditors with 
domicile determinations, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New 
York have listed certain objective factors indicative of a 
taxpayer’s subjective intent with respect to domicile. 
 
E. Domicile Factors 
 
Thirty-three states use a set of factors to determine 
domicile for tax purposes.110  These states use these objective 
factors to ascertain the subjective intention of taxpayers with 




In its regulations, Massachusetts defines domicile as “the 
place which is an individual’s true, fixed and permanent home, 
determined by established common law principles and the facts 
and circumstances in each case.”111  The Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue has identified the following domicile 
factors on its website, under guidance entitled “Changing your 
domicile,” that it believes will guide taxpayers in a 
determination of whether they have changed their domicile.112 
 
106.  Id. at 10–14. 
107.  Id. at 12. 
108.  Id. at 7. These five factors constitute New York’s primary domicile 
factors, discussed in Part I, E. 3 below. 
109.  Id. at 21. 
110.  MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 6. 
111.  830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(2) (2018). 
112.  Learn About Legal and Residency Status in Massachusetts, MASS. 
GOV., https://www.mass.gov/service-details/learn-about-legal-and-residency-
status-in-massachusetts (last visited July 11, 2019). 
21
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Factors that will be considered when determining if you’ve 
changed your domicile: 
 
 You’ve purchased or leased a new home or an 
apartment in the new location 
 You’ve moved his personal property to the new 
location 
 You got permanent employment in the new 
location 
 You canceled Massachusetts bank accounts 
and opened new accounts in the new location 
 You sold real property in Massachusetts or 
canceled leases 
 You issued address change notices 
 You changed voter registration 
 You got a driver’s license and automobile 
registration in the new location 
 You changed membership in churches and 
clubs 
 Generally, you’re involved in the new 
community113 
 
Although the Massachusetts Department of Revenue examines 
each of the factors described above, Massachusetts has signed 
the Northeastern States Tax Officials Association Cooperative 
Agreement on Determination of Domicile requiring a focus on 




Minnesota uses twenty-six factors to determine domicile.114  
This list represents the Minnesota Department of Revenue’s 
attempt to specify concrete relationships, activity, behavior, or 
other actions that it believes constitutes objective evidence of an 
individual intent to establish a permanent home.  Because some 
of the twenty-six factors overlap with one another, taxpayers 
and their representatives can combine the factors into groups to 
 
113.  Id. 
114.  MINN R. 8001.0300 subp. 3 (2019). 
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simplify the relevant concepts:  employment-related factors; 
homes and living arrangements; business relationships; social 
and civic relationships; and other factors. 
Minnesota’s twenty-six factors, or the “A-Z factors,” follow: 
 
Considerations. The following items listed will be 
considered in determining whether or not a 
person is domiciled in this state: 
 [L]ocation of domicile for prior years; 
 [W]here the person votes or is registered to 
vote, but casting an illegal vote does not 
establish domicile for income tax purposes; 
 [S]tatus as a student; 
 [C]lassification of employment as temporary 
or permanent; 
 [L]ocation of employment; 
 [L]ocation of newly acquired living quarters 
whether owned or rented; 
 [P]resent status of the former living quarters, 
i.e., whether it was sold, offered for sale, 
rented, or available for rent to another; 
 [W]hether homestead status has been 
requested and/or obtained for property tax 
purposes on newly purchased living quarters 
and whether the homestead status of the 
former living quarters has not been renewed; 
 [O]wnership of other real property; 
 [J]urisdiction in which a valid driver’s license 
was issued; 
 [J]urisdiction from which any professional 
licenses were issued; 
 [L]ocation of the person’s union membership; 
 [J]urisdiction from which any motor vehicle 
license was issued and the actual physical 
location of the vehicles; 
 [W]hether resident or nonresident fishing or 
hunting licenses purchased; 
 [W]hether an income tax return has been filed 
as a resident or nonresident; 
 [W]hether the person has fulfilled the tax 
23
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obligations required of a resident; 
 [L]ocation of any bank accounts, especially the 
location of the most active checking account; 
 [L]ocation of other transactions with financial 
institutions; 
 [L]ocation of the place of worship at which the 
person is a member; 
 [L]ocation of business relationships and the 
place where business is transacted; 
 [L]ocation of social, fraternal, or athletic 
organizations or clubs or in a lodge or country 
club, in which the person is a member; 
 [A]ddress where mail is received; 
 [P]ercentage of time (not counting hours of 
employment) that the person is physically 
present in Minnesota and the percentage of 
time (not counting hours of employment)that 
the person is physically present in each 
jurisdiction other than Minnesota; 
 [L]ocation of jurisdiction from which 
unemployment compensation benefits are 
received; 
 [L]ocation of schools at which the person or the 
person’s spouse or children attend, and 
whether resident or nonresident tuition was 
charged; and 
 [S]tatements made to an insurance company, 
concerning the person’s residence, and on 
which the insurance is based.115 
 
Unlike Massachusetts and New York, Minnesota has not 
adopted the five factors of the Northeastern States Tax Officials 
Association Cooperative Agreement on the Determination of 
Domicile as the most important or primary factors to be 




115.  Id. 
116.  See id. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
ARTICLE 8_THOMAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:45 PM 
2019 DOMICILE IN MULTISTATE 899 
3. New York 
 
New York divides its domicile factors into two general 
categories: primary factors and other factors.117  An analysis of 
the five primary factors (home, active business involvement, 
time, items near and dear, and family connections) should 
generally provide a basis for New York domicile before 
documentation concerning the “other” factors is requested from 
the taxpayer.118  The analysis of the primary factors should look 
at the New York ties for the specific factor in relation to the ties 
for the factor that exist in other locations.119 
New York also listed the following other factors: 
 
 The address at which bank statements, bills, 
financial data and correspondence concerning 
other family business is primarily received. 
 The physical location of the safe deposit boxes 
used for family records and valuables. 
 Location of auto, boat, and airplane 
registrations as well as the individual’s 
personal driver’s or operator’s license. 
 Where the taxpayer is registered to vote and 
an analysis of the exercise of said privilege. 
The auditor should not limit the review to the 
general elections in November, but also 
question the taxpayer’s participation in 
primary or other off-season elections, 
including school board and budget elections. 
 Possession of a Manhattan Parking Tax 
exemption. 
 An analysis of telephone services at each 
residence including the nature of the listing, 
the type of service features, and the activity at 
the location. 
 The citation in legal documents that a 
particular location is to be considered the 
 
117.  STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF TAX’N AND FIN., supra note 33, at 14. 
118.  Id. at 15–33. 
119.  Id. at 15–34. 
25
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individual’s place of domicile or that a 
particular residence is considered to be a 
primary residence. Examples would include, 
but are not limited to, wills; divorce decrees or 
separation agreements; applications for school 
tax relief exemption (STAR); leases for rent-
controlled or rent-stabilized apartments. 
 Green cards indicating that an immigrant can 
legally reside in the United States on a 
permanent basis.120 
 
In addition, the Guidelines list factors deemed irrelevant in 
determining one’s domicile.  The Guidelines call these items 
“non-factors” and instruct auditors not to invest time in 
exploring their impact on the domicile issue and not to accept 
these as proof of domicile when received from taxpayers.121  
These non-factors include but are not limited to: 
 
 The place of interment; 
 The location where the taxpayer’s will is 
probated; 
 Passive interest in partnerships or small 
corporations; 
 The mere location of bank accounts; 
 Contributions made to political candidates, or 
causes; and 
 The location where the taxpayer’s individual 
income tax returns are prepared and filed.122 
 
4. NESTOA Agreement 
 
On October 2, 1996, eleven states and the District of 
Columbia entered into a cooperative agreement known as the 
Northeastern States Tax Officials Association Cooperative 
Agreement on Determination of Domicile.123  This Agreement 
 
120.  Id. at 38. 
121.  Id. at 40. 
122.  Id. at 40. 
123. Northeastern States Tax Officials Association Cooperative 
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describes its purpose as facilitating the application of the tax 
laws in a fair and consistent manner that fosters compliance, 
reduces multiple taxation, increases tax revenue, and lowers the 
burden on compliant taxpayers.124  More specifically, the policy 
goals for the working group drafting the NESTOA Cooperative 
agreement were as follows: 
 
 Individuals should only be determined to be 
domiciliaries by one state for a specific period 
of time; 
 Individuals should not pay tax on identical 
income to multiple states; and 
 Criteria used should be as uniform as possible 
to increase voluntary compliance and allow for 
the easy exchange of information among the 
NESTOA states.125 
 
The states ultimately agreed on the following five most 
important domicile factors for investigation in domicile disputes: 
(1) size, use and relative value of dwelling places; (2) relative 
time spent in each jurisdiction; (3) location of “near and dear” 
items; (4) location of principal business involvement; and (5) 
location of family connections.126 
Where appropriate, the Agreement also discusses the 
consideration of other factors:  location of social and civic 
activities, location of places of worship, and other indicia of 
residence.127  When addressing each of the factors, the 




What are the residences owned or rented by the taxpayer?  
Where are they located?  How are they used?  What is the size 
and value of each residence?  Responses to all such questions 
 
Agreement on Determination of Domicile, Oct. 1, 1996 [hereinafter NESTOA 
Cooperative Agreement]. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. § 1. 
126.  Id. § 2. 
127.  Id. 
27
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Where and how the individual spends time during the tax 
year shall be considered.  Consideration shall also be given to 
whether the taxpayer is retired or actively involved in a business 
or profession.  How much travel the individual does and the 
nature of the travel shall be considered.  The overall living 
pattern or life style of the individual shall be examined. 
 
Items “Near & Dear” 
 
The location of the items or possessions that the individual 
considers “near and dear” to his or her heart, of significant 
sentimental value, family heirlooms, collections of valuables or 
possessions that enhance the quality of one’s life style shall all 
be reviewed. 
 
Active Business Involvement 
 
How the taxpayer earns a living, whether the taxpayer is 
actively involved in any business ownerships or professions and 
to what degree the individual is involved as well as how that 
involvement compares to the involvement in business outside of 




When the first four factors are not conclusive, courts should 
review where the individual’s minor children attend school and, 
in certain unique and discrete situations, the residence of the 
individual’s immediate family.128 
The five factors represent a step forward in an effort to 
clarify the definition of domicile.  However, each factor has more 
than one question in its body, the Agreement does not prioritize 
the factors or the questions within each factor, and the 
Agreement continues to permit a review of other indicia of 
 
128.  Id. 
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domicile where appropriate.129  Like the domicile factors of each 
state described above, the Agreement attempts to bring 
certainty to the subjective intent of a taxpayer, through a review 
of objective factors, by individuals unfamiliar with the 
taxpayer’s true intention. 
 
II.  The Problems with the Current System 
 
Residency determinations in states asserting the domicile 
of a taxpayer are uncertain, unpredictable, and time-consuming, 
which results in the inefficient administration of these laws.  
These deficiencies are brought about by the application of a 
subjective standard, the burden and standard of proof placed on 
taxpayers, and the domicile bias of auditors conducting these 
audits. 
 
A. Difficulties with a Subjective Standard 
 
In the drafting of the NESTOA Cooperative Agreement, 
the Northeastern States noted that “[t]he problems associated 
with domicile and residency are difficult to address because of 
the subjective nature of this whole area.”130  Before the drafting 
of the NESTOA Cooperative Agreement, the courts in 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York had their own 
struggles with the subjective standards.  Since state law 
generally looks to objective factors to determine the subjective 
intentions of taxpayers, taxpayers and the states have fought 
over the identification of the relevant factors and the relative 
weight given each factor.  The following discussion reflects 
judicial and administrative difficulties with a subjective 




As a starting point to our discussion of state difficulties 
with a subjective standard, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court described the domicile standard as follows: 
 
129.  NESTOA Cooperative Agreement, supra note 123. 
130.  Id. 
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No exact definition can be given of domicil; it 
depends upon no one fact or combination of 
circumstances, but from the whole taken together 
it must be determined in each particular case . . . 
; and it may often occur, that the evidence of facts 
tending to establish the domicil in one place, 
would be entirely conclusive, were it not for the 
existence of facts and circumstances of a still more 
conclusive and decisive character, which fix it, 
beyond question, in another.131 
 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court followed this 
quotation with a discussion of the weight given each of the 
factors and combinations of factors used in applying a subjective 
standard.132  The Court held that the fact finder in a particular 
dispute must determine the weight given to each factor or 
combination of factors.133 
In a more recent decision, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court reiterated the standard’s lack of guidance when 
it stated, “[a]scertainment of the domicil [sic] of an individual is 
mainly a question of fact to be determined from all the evidence 
and circumstances.”134  That determination “depends upon no 
one fact or combination of circumstances but upon all the factors 
disclosed in the particular case.”135 
These decisions leave taxpayers and administrators with 
no advance guidance with respect to the weight given to each 
factor or combination of factors.  This situation improves slightly 
with application of the five factors of the NESTOA Cooperative 
Agreement, but potential Massachusetts domiciled taxpayers 
face we-know-it-when-we-see-it disputes with little or no 




131.  Tax Collector of Lowell v. Hanchett, 134 N.E. 355, 357 (Mass. 1922). 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Commonwealth v. Davis, 187 N.E. 33, 37 (Mass. 1933). 
135.  Id. at 50. 
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2. Minnesota 
 
Minnesota’s rules accurately summarize the analysis used 
in most states: “No positive rule can be adopted with respect to 
the evidence necessary to prove an intention to change a 
domicile but such intention may be proved by acts and 
declarations, and of the two forms of evidence, acts must be 
given more weight than declarations.”136  Like Massachusetts, 
Minnesota’s rules begin with the proposition that the analysis 
involves an effort to discern subjective intent and no precise 
definition will uniformly guide taxpayers and state taxing 
authorities in their interpretations.137 
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed its domicile 
factors and the relative weight given each factor in Mauer v. 
Commissioner of Revenue.138  First, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court rejected an approach that determined domicile by 
counting factors; it then proceeded to count factors and found 
that the taxpayer had established a Minnesota domicile.139  The 
taxpayer argued that three factors favored Minnesota domicile 
and the remaining eleven factors favored domicile in no 
particular state.140  The Commissioner argued that ten factors 
favored Minnesota domicile and four favored domicile in no 
particular state.141  In determining the taxpayer’s domicile, the 
Minnesota Tax Court found that eight of the twenty-six factors 
favored Minnesota domicile, six factors favored Florida domicile, 
six provided no indication of domicile, and six did not apply.142  
The dissent felt the majority got lost in the twenty-six factor test, 
while ignoring major events of the taxpayer’s life.143  When 
commenting on the domicile test, the dissent said, “[t]axpayers 
in Minnesota enter the domicile swamp at their own peril.”144  In 
response to the dissent, the majority noted, “[w]e acknowledge 
 
136.  MINN. R. 8001.0300 subp. 2 (2019). 
137.  Id. 
138.  829 N.W.2d 59 (Minn. 2013). 
139.  Id. at 69–70. 
140.  Id. at 70. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Mauer, 829 N.W.2d at 78. 
144.  Id. 
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that any inquiry about a taxpayer’s domicile will be an intensive 
fact-specific inquiry and that the results of such fact-specific 
inquiries may not always be as precise as we would hope. But 
the factors do have merit and do provide guidance.”145 
The dissent took issue with the twenty-six factor domicile 
test by calling it “no test at all” and rejected the Commissioner’s 
depiction of the current approach to domicile as “common 
sense.”146  The dissent compared the Commissioner’s review of 
the factors in Mauer to similar findings of the Commissioner in 
other cases before the Minnesota Supreme Court.147  According 
to the dissent, the Commissioner selectively minimizes 
documentary declarations of domicile, such as the address on a 
driver’s license.148  In Mauer, because the taxpayer had attained 
a Florida driver’s license, the Commissioner disregarded the 
documentary declaration.149  In other cases, the Commissioner 
emphasized a failure to change a driver’s license address as 
evidence of no change in domicile.150  Similarly, the 
Commissioner dismissed Mauer’s Florida homestead status as 
an easily met requirement.151  However, when the taxpayer did 
not change his or her homestead status, the Commissioner had 
previously treated that failure as evidence of no change in 
domicile.152 
The Minnesota Tax Court has labeled “posturing” factors 
the items dismissed by the Commissioner and discussed above 
in the Mauer dissent.153  In Page v. Commissioner, the Minnesota 
Tax Court considered a taxpayer’s acts such as “sending change 
of address cards to various credit card companies and other 
creditors, closing their Minneapolis bank accounts, and relying 
solely upon their Illinois bank accounts” as carrying little, if any, 
 
145.  Id. at 75. 
146.  Id. at 78. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Mauer, 829 N.W.2d at 78. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. (citing Syfco v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4624, 1987 WL 5138, at 
*6 (Minn. T.C. Feb. 11, 1987)). 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. (citing Page v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4011, 1986 WL 15695, at 
*7 (Minn. T.C. Mar. 12, 1986)). 
153.  Page, 1986 WL 15695, at *9. 
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weight in a domicile analysis.154  In Sanchez v. Commissioner, 
the Minnesota Tax Court similarly dismissed out-of-state 
driver’s licenses, checking account, credit cards, and voter 
registration.155 
In summary, it appears at times that the Commissioner 
finds the “posturing” factors compelling when absent and less 
than compelling when present.  The majority in Mauer 
acknowledged such a potential for abuse: 
 
[W]e acknowledge and agree with the dissent’s 
desire to convey to both the Commissioner and the 
tax court that they must strive to apply the 
Department’s factors in a consistent and equitable 
manner. For taxpayers to have trust and 
confidence that Minnesota’s tax system is fairly 
and equitably applied to all, it is vitally important 
that taxpayers be able to understand the 
Department’s factors and how those factors are 
applied in any given situation. Such an 
understanding is important so that taxpayers can 
adjust their expectations, intentions, and actions 
accordingly.156 
 
3. New York 
 
Individuals facing potential New York residency audits 
must also assess the domicile factors with a focus on the primary 
factors described above in Part I(E)(3).  Although a more 
complete discussion of these primary factors occurs in a 
discussion of the NESTOA Cooperative Agreement that follows, 
one particular dispute highlights some of the eccentricity of the 
courts in addressing these matters. 
In re Blatt illustrates a court’s analysis of the domicile 
factors and a court’s fixation on one element of a particular 
domicile factor.157  The taxpayer moved from New York to Texas 
 
154.  Id. 
155.  No. 7910, 2008 WL 8679077, at *5 (Minn. T.C. Oct. 9, 2008). 
156.  Mauer v. Comm’r of Revenue, 829 N.W.2d 59, 76 n.2 (Minn. 2013). 
157.  DTA No. 826504 (N.Y.S. Div. Tax App., Feb. 2, 2017). 
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for a new job.158  He initially maintained a residence in each 
state, but over time committed to living in Texas.159  Subsequent 
to the year at issue, the taxpayer returned to New York for a 
new position.160  While he was living in Texas, he stopped paying 
tax to New York as a resident.161  Among the various domicile 
factors weighed by the court were the taxpayer’s “near and dear” 
items.162  Although the taxpayer maintained a home in both New 
York and Texas, he moved his beloved dog from New York to 
Texas.163  The dog’s location compelled a finding of domicile in 
Texas.164  Did Blatt offer compelling testimony or did the 
administrative law judge love dogs? 
 
4. NESTOA Cooperative Agreement 
 
In Part I(E)(3), this Article lists the five primary indicia of 
domicile as follows: 
 
 Home. Size, use and relative value of dwelling 
places. 
 Time.  Relative time spent in each jurisdiction. 
 Near and Dear.  Location of “near and dear” 
items. 
 Business.  Location of principal business 
involvement. 
 Family.  Location of family connections. 
 
Each factor has more than one question in its body, the 
Agreement does not prioritize the factors or the questions within 
each factor, and the Agreement continues to permit a review of 
other indicia of domicile “where appropriate.”165  The NESTOA 
Cooperative Agreement also describes some of the questions 
auditors should investigate in their analyses of each factor.  
 
158.  Id. at ¶ 55. 
159.  Id. at ¶¶ 38, 40, 42, 55. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. at 22. 
163.  In re Blatt, DTA No. 826504 at ¶ 22. 
164.  Id. 
165.  NESTOA Cooperative Agreement, supra note 123. 
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However, these questions cannot encompass all the possible 
nuances of an individual’s life in arriving at subjective intent to 
establish a domicile in a particular jurisdiction.  It takes little 
imagination to expand and question the sufficiency of the 
questions provided for each of the primary factors.  For 
illustrative purposes, consider the questions used to measure 
the relative size, use, and market value of a dwelling place 
owned by the taxpayer when that taxpayer owns more than one 
home. 
Should an auditor give less weight to the home factor when 
the taxpayer’s family lives in another jurisdiction?  Did the 
taxpayer decorate the home with “near and dear” items, and how 
does their value affect the relative value comparison?  Should a 
consideration of relative value involve an adjustment for cost of 
living by location?  If the taxpayer plans to downsize upon 
retirement, should the auditor give less weight to the relative 
size and value of the dwelling?  How should an auditor assess 
the relative size, use, and market value of a home where the 
taxpayer cannot occupy the home due to a spousal separation 
agreement?  When a home in the claimed former residence 
jurisdiction has a loss of market value below the principal of the 
mortgage, should the auditor ignore the retention of the home?  
In addition to the nuances that may affect the domicile analysis, 
the taxpayer has the burden of proof in these disputes, and often 
the level of proof exceeds that imposed in other tax matters. 
 
B. Burden and Standard of Proof 
 
Litigants with the burden of proof have the responsibility 
to put forth sufficient evidence to prevail on their claims.166  This 
burden of proof entails both the burden of producing the 
evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact.167  The 
standard of proof refers to the amount of evidence required to 
prove a legal claim or assertion.168  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that a standard of proof serves to “instruct the factfinder 
 
166.  John T. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function 
of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955). 
167.  Id. at 1382–83. 
168.  Standard of Proof, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
35
ARTICLE 8_THOMAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:45 PM 
910 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should 
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular 
type of adjudication.”169  Ordinarily, courts apply a 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in civil 
claims.170  In some instances, civil cases apply a higher standard 
referred to as the clear and convincing standard.171 
When the standard of proof for the particular matter 
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the party with 
the burden of proof must establish the facts to be more probably 
true than false.172  The clear and convincing standard requires 
that the “truth of the facts asserted should be strong.”173  The 
party with the burden of proof “must establish that the facts, 




In Massachusetts, the burden of proof in tax matters 
generally rests with taxpayers.175  However, Massachusetts 
places the burden of proof on the party asserting that a change 
of domicile has occurred.176  The practical implications are that 
taxpayers leaving the state have the burden of proving a change 
of domicile and the Massachusetts Department of Revenue has 
the burden of proof with respect to taxpayers entering the state.  
Typically, in the absence of a statutory mandate, Massachusetts 
taxpayers face a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof 
 
169.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
170.  J. P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 
242, 245 (1944). 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. at 247. 
173.  Id. at 253. 
174.  Id. at 254. 
175.  See Towle v. Comm’r of Revenue, 492 N.E.2d 739, 741–42 (Mass. 
1986) (referring to use tax on boat); William Rodman & Sons, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm’n., 368 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Mass. 1977) (referring to excise tax on 
cigarettes); Staples v. Comm’r of Corps. & Taxation., 24 N.E.2d 641, 643–44 
(Mass. 1940) (referring to income tax on annuity income). 
176.  Horvitz v. Comm’r of Revenue, 747 N.E.2d 177 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) 
(noting that the Commissioner in this case had both the burden of production 
and the burden of persuasion since the Commissioner was asserting a change 
of domicile). 
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Minnesota also believes that the burden of proof falls on 
the party asserting that a change of domicile has taken place.178  
Minnesota applies a preponderance of the evidence standard of 
proof.179  Therefore, like in Massachusetts and New York, the 
practical implications are that taxpayers leaving the state have 
the burden of proving a change of domicile and the Minnesota 
Department of Taxation has the burden of proof with respect to 
taxpayers entering the state. 
 
3. New York 
 
New York law provides that the burden of proving a change 
of domicile rests with the party asserting the change.180  
Therefore, like in Massachusetts, the practical implications are 
that taxpayers leaving the state have the burden of proving a 
change of domicile and the New York Department of Taxation 
has the burden of proof with respect to taxpayers entering the 
state.  The difference between Massachusetts and New York is 
the standard applied.  Massachusetts applies a preponderance 
of the evidence standard, and New York applies a clear and 
convincing standard.181  Therefore, New York taxpayers 
asserting a domicile change must meet the burden of proof and 





177.  See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. F239697, F239698, 
& F245722, 2005 WL 2179233 (Mass. App. Tax Bd., Sept. 8, 2005). 
178.  In re Smith’s Estate, 64 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Minn. 1954); McCutchan 
v. Comm’r of Taxation, Docket No. 563 (Minn. Tax Ct. Jan. 20, 1956). 
179.  Red Owl Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 117 N.W.2d 401, 407 
(Minn. 1962). 
180.  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 105.20(d)(2) (McKinney 2019); see generally 
Bodfish v. Gallman, 378 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1976). 
181.  Ruderman v. Ruderman, 82 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481 (1948). 
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C. Domicile or Residency Bias 
 
Taxpayers can find domicile or residency bias in 
administrative guidance issued by the states and in their 
respective court decisions.  This bias may generate a 
disproportionate number of audits of taxpayers with proposed 
no-tax residency states and finds its way into the court decisions 
and arguments put forth by the commissioners of revenue.  
Minnesota and New York have not hidden that bias well. 
The above discussion of Minnesota’s domicile factors 
argues that the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue finds the 
“posturing” factors compelling when absent and less than 
compelling when present.182  If pushed, the Commissioner of 
Revenue would likely argue that these positions reflect zealous 
advocacy rather than bias and other facts supported a domicile 
and residency conclusion.  However, the Mauer dissent made a 
compelling argument that the Commissioner of Revenue has 
made selective use of the “posturing” domicile factors.183 
Minnesota has also wrestled with the role of tax avoidance 
in domicile determinations.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
stated, “[i]t is to be pointed out that if the necessary intention to 
change one’s domicile is, in fact, present, the motive or purpose 
in making the change [e.g., tax avoidance] is unimportant.”184  
However, one commentator has suggested that the actions of 
Minnesota courts do not always follow this mandate.185  In 
furtherance of his belief that tax avoidance is considered, this 
commentator goes further and suggests proposed residency 
states with no income tax are disproportionately at issue in 
domicile disputes before Minnesota courts.186  “Minnesota is 
often referred to among friends as ‘the Hotel California: You can 
check out any time you like, but you can never leave.’”187 
 
182.  See infra Part II(A)(2). 
183.  Mauer v. Comm’r of Revenue, 829 N.W.2d 59, 78 (Minn. 2013). 
184.  Miller v. Comm’r of Taxation, 59 N.W.2d 925, 926 n.2 (Minn. 1953) 
(internal citations omitted). 
185.  Joseph E. Cooch, When Everything Matters, Nothing Matters: 
Minnesota’s Unprincipled Approach for Determining Domicile in Tax Disputes, 
and a Path Forward, 37 HAMLINE L. REV. 229, 247 (2014). 
186.  Id. 
187.  Dale Kurschner, The Great Migration, TWIN CITIES BUS., at 41, (Apr. 
2016), http://pageturnpro2.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/Publicat 
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The New York Nonresident Audit Guidelines direct the 
department’s auditors to pay special attention to taxpayers who 
recognize large capital gains immediately after a reported 
change of domicile.  “Large capital gains are uncommon, and 
often the only change in lifestyle demonstrated by the individual 
is the fact that a substantial gain was realized in the year of, or 
immediately after, the alleged change of domicile.”188  This 
language in the New York Nonresident Audit Guidelines 
demonstrates a residency bias by implying that taxpayers assert 
domicile change to avoid tax following a large capital gain.  
Despite the Department’s assertion that individuals assert 
domicile change to avoid tax, on many occasions the link 
between the capital gain and the domicile change could be a 
mere change in employment status or other life event.  Indeed, 
that large capital gain could be the sale of stock in a business 
following an individual’s retirement. 
The Guidelines miss the mark in at least one other respect.  
Although courts must review a taxpayer’s intentions to change 
her domicile, an intention to avoid tax should not affect that 
taxpayer’s status as a domiciliary.  At least in New York, the 
courts have long recognized the right of a taxpayer to “change 
his or her domicile for the purpose of avoiding taxation.”189  In 
Ingle v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, the Court considered 
the state income tax consequences of domicile abandonment in a 
review of a taxpayer’s subjective intent to change her domicile.190  
Where a New York domiciliary relocated to Tennessee during 
the year, a dispute existed about the timing of her change 
in domicile.191  The taxpayer’s employer sold the business in 
which the taxpayer owned stock.192  Aware that she would 
realize a large capital gain on her stock and owe considerable 
New York income tax, the taxpayer hastened her move back to 
Tennessee.193  The Court found that the taxpayer’s tax avoidance 
 
ions/201603/1688/71391/PDF/131032230076236000_TCB0416.pdf. 
188.  State of N.Y. Dep’t of Tax’n and Fin., supra note 33 at 84. 
189.  Andrews v. Graves, 32 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1942), aff’d, 42 N.E.2d 748 
(N.Y. 1942). 
190.  973 N.Y.S.2d 877 (2013). 
191.  Id. at 879–80. 
192.  Id. at 880. 
193.  Id.  
39
ARTICLE 8_THOMAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:45 PM 
914 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
motive, among other matters, supported the conclusion that she 
did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
her domicile changed to Tennessee prior to the stock sale.194 
New York defines domicile as “the place which an 
individual intends to be such individual’s permanent home - the 
place to which such individual intends to return whenever such 
individual may be absent.”195  Minnesota defines domicile as 
“that place in which that person’s habitation is fixed, without 
any present intentions of removal therefrom, and to which, 
whenever absent, that person intends to return.”196  An 
individual’s motivation, pure or riddled with tax avoidance, 
appears in neither state’s definition of domicile.  This bias has 
infected Minnesota and New York’s judicial determinations.  
Adopting a new standard for residency, such as that used in 
federal income tax, may remove this bias and lead to equitable 
results for taxpayers and states. 
 
III.  Following the Feds 
 
Under current law and similar to state personal income tax 
laws, the Internal Revenue Code imposes tax on the worldwide 
income of resident aliens and U.S. citizens.197  However, the 
Internal Revenue Code imposes tax on nonresident aliens only 
to the extent their income flows from U.S. sources or constitutes 
income effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or 
business.198  Therefore, similar to state personal income tax 
laws, residency status results in a broad base for taxation. 
As described below, Congress arrived at the current 
statutes controlling the taxation of aliens after a journey 
through the uncertainty that existed under prior law.  A history 
of the evolution of federal income taxation in this area may 




194.  Id. at 880–81 (referring to a vehicle registration and registration to 
vote in Tennessee done to escape taxation). 
195.  N.Y. TAX LAW, § 105.20(d)(1) (McKinney 2019). 
196.  MINN.. R. 8001.0300 subp. 2 (2019). 
197.  I.R.C. § 1 (2017). 
198.  See I.R.C. § 2(d) (2005); § 871 (2018). 
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A. Defining a Resident―The First 70 Years 
 
Prior to 1984, the Internal Revenue Code did not define the 
terms “resident alien” or “nonresident alien.”199  Instead, 
taxpayers relied on Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings 
for guidance.  Treasury Regulations generally determined 
residency based on an alien’s intentions and the length and 
nature of his or her stay.200 
 
An alien actually present in the United States 
who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a 
resident of the United States for purposes of the 
income tax.  Whether he is a transient is 
determined by his intentions with regard to the 
length and nature of his stay.  A mere floating 
intention, indefinite as to time, to return to 
another country is not sufficient to constitute him 
a transient.  If he lives in the United States and 
has no definite intention as to his stay, he is a 
resident.  One who comes to the United States for 
a definite purpose which in its nature may be 
promptly accomplished is a transient; but, if his 
purpose is of such a nature that an extended stay 
may be necessary for its accomplishment, and to 
that end the alien makes his home temporarily in 
the United States, he becomes a resident, though 
it may be his intention at all times to return to his 
domicile abroad when the purpose for which he 
came has been consummated or abandoned.  An 
alien whose stay in the United States is limited to 
a definite period by the immigration laws is not a 
resident of the United States within the meaning 





199.  Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2 (1957). 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. 
41
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Unfortunately, in an attempt to define resident alien, the 
regulation quoted above used other undefined terms that needed 
definition.202  The regulation lacked definitions of transient, 
sojourner, and floating intention.203  These undefined terms 
provided little additional guidance because the factors used to 
define resident alien also lacked a precise definition.  
Unfortunately, the Regulations further confused taxpayers by 
creating a set of rebuttable presumptions concerning the length 
and nature of the alien’s stay in the United States.204 
With the exception of one revenue ruling, the rulings 
provided little guidance because they addressed narrow fact 
patterns and questions.  Revenue Ruling 69-611, one of the few 
rulings of general application, offered some guidance on the 
issue of residence.205  Revenue Ruling 69-611 raised a 
presumption of residence if an alien remained within the United 
States for one full year.  Taxpayers could rebut this presumption 
with proof they did not intend to remain in the country and came 
to the U.S. as mere visitors.206 
 
B. Reason for the Federal Law Change 
 
Congress believed that the tax law should provide a more 
objective definition of residence for income tax purposes.207  The 
enactment of Section 7701(b) reflected Congressional intent, 
through an objective definition of residence, to facilitate tax 
planning, return preparation, and enforcement.208  Congress 
understood that an objective definition might allow some aliens 
otherwise taxable as residents to avoid resident status, and 
would impose resident status on some aliens that did not meet 
the definition of residents under the current rules.209  On 
balance, however, Congress found that the certainty provided by 
 
202.  § 1.871-2(b). 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
206.  Id. 
207.  H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1523 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
468. 
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
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the new objective definition outweighed other considerations 
and adopted a regime that depended on length of stay.210 
 
C. Section 7701(b) Arrives 
 
In its switch to an objective definition of resident, Congress 
incorporated its new definition in Section 7701(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  Section 7701(b) begins with the proposition that 
aliens (not U.S. citizens) pay tax as nonresident aliens unless 
they meet one of two tests.  Aliens meeting either the “green card 
test” or the “substantial presence test” for the calendar year face 
taxation of their worldwide income similar to the taxation of 
residents for state personal income tax purposes.211 
A taxpayer meets the “green card test” if the individual has (1) 
attained the privilege of residing permanently in the United 
States under the immigration laws; and (2) the government has 
not revoked that status.212  A taxpayer meets the “substantial 
presence test” if the individual has physical presence in the 
United States on at least: (1) thirty-one days during the current 
year, and (2) 183 days during the three-year period that includes 
the current year and the two years immediately before that, 
including: (a) All the days you were present in the current year, 
(b) 1/3 of the days you were present in the first year before the 
current year, and (c) 1/6 of the days you were present in the 
second year before the current year.213 
This “substantial presence test” effectively captures and 
taxes the worldwide income of individuals that have spent 183 
days in the United States in the current taxable year.  This test 
also captures those individuals spending 183 days in the United 
States over a three-year period, but accords less weight to the 
preceding years in arriving at the total days.  This extended test 
prevents taxpayers from stringing together nearly a full year of 
U.S. presence without taxation as a resident.  For example, in 
the absence of this extended period test, an individual could 
couple a stay of 182 days in one year with another 182 days 
 
210.  Id. 
211.  I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2018). 
212.  §§ 7701(b)(1)(A)(i), 7701(b)(6) (2018). 
213.  § 7701(b)(3)(A) (2018). 
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immediately following in the succeeding year without taxation 
as a resident. 
 




Until 1995, Massachusetts defined a resident solely as an 
individual domiciled in the state.  The legislature adopted 
provisions similar to Section 7701(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code when it enacted Chapter 38 of the Acts of 1995 modifying 
the definition of “resident” to add the permanent place of abode 
and 183 days of presence test to the domicile standard (without 
the extended period of Section 7701(b)).214  Instead of following 
Congress’s replacement of the domicile standard, Massachusetts 
expanded its residency definition by adding an alternative way 




Minnesota’s residency rules have remained largely 
unchanged since enactment of its personal income tax in 1933 
(and the Minnesota Department of Revenue’s adoption of the 
twenty-six factor test in 1982).215  However, in 1987, Minnesota 
adopted the permanent place of abode and 183 days of 
“substantial presence test.”216  Like Massachusetts, Minnesota 
expanded its residency definition by adding an alternative way 
to treat individuals as residents. 
 
3. New York 
 
Unlike, Massachusetts and Minnesota, New York adopted 
its “presence test” prior to enactment of Section 7701(b) of the 
 
214.  See TIR 95-7: Change in the Definition of “Resident” for 
Massachusetts Income Tax Purposes, MASS.GOV (Jan. 10, 1996), 
https://www.mass.gov/technical-information-release/tir-95-7-change-in-the-de 
finition-of-resident-for-massachusetts. 
215.  See MINN. R. 8001.0300(2) (2019). 
216.  1987 MINN. LAWS 1044. 
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Internal Revenue Code.217  In 1922, the New York State 
Legislature enacted a statutory definition of a resident for 
income tax purposes that included a person “who maintains a 
permanent place of abode within the state, and spends in the 
aggregate more than seven months of the taxable year within 
the state.”218  The tax department supported the new law as “an 
alternative to the highly subjective common law test of domicile, 
which had governed residency determinations until that 
point.”219  In 1954, the Legislature amended the seven-month 
test for presence in New York and replaced it with the 183-day 
rule.220  In explaining the justification for the proposed change, 
the department’s memorandum in support noted that there had 
been many cases of tax avoidance, even evasion, and that 
“persons who really are residents nevertheless manage to 
comply with the present seven-month rule by spending long 
weekends, holidays and vacations outside the state.”221 
 
IV.  Tax Policy 
 
The domicile standards enacted by the states fail the test 
of fundamental principles of tax policy.  An adoption of an 
objective standard can move states toward better tax policy. 
 
A. Fundamental Principles of a Sound Tax System 
 
Adam Smith set forth four maxims applicable to taxes in 
general: (1) taxes should be proportional to taxpayers’ abilities 
to pay, (2) the tax due should be certain and not arbitrary, (3) 
 
217.  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 350(7) (1987) (repealed 1987). 
218.  See id. 
219.  Timothy P. Noonan & Joshua K. Lawrence, The Goods on Gaied: 
What It Means, From the Front Lines, Noonan’s NOTES BLOG 409, 409 n.4 (May 
19, 2014), https://www.hodgsonruss.com/media/publication/44_The%20Goods 
%20on%20Gaied%20-%20What%20It%20Means,%20From%20the%20Front% 
20Lines%205%2019%2014.pdf. (stating “the tax law had previously defined 
the term ‘resident’ as ‘any person who shall, at any time during the last six 
months of the calendar year, be a resident of the state.’ But it did not define 
what constituted being a resident during that period”). 
220.  Id. at 410 (citing Mem. of Dept. of Taxation & Finance, 1954 N.Y. 
LEGIS. ANN., at 296). 
221.  Id. 
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the tax should be levied at a convenient time, and (4) the tax 
should be administered in the most economical way possible.222  
Similar to the tax policy principles in The Wealth of Nations, the 
states have developed and published their own tax policy 
principles.223 
In 2010, The National Conference of State Legislatures 
released a handbook that addressed tax policy principles that 
states should consider when imposing a personal income tax.224  
The handbook concludes that states should review the 
reliability, equity, compliance and administration, interstate 
and international competition, economic neutrality, and 
accountability of their personal income tax laws.225  Of these 
principles, domicile presents the greatest challenge to 
compliance and administration.  Although this document does 
not address residency or domicile in its discussion, the handbook 
does discuss the need to reduce compliance costs for taxpayers 
and limit the amount of required record maintenance.226 
In 2013, the Massachusetts Legislature established the 
Tax Fairness Commission.227  The Massachusetts Legislature 
charged the Commission with analyzing Massachusetts tax laws 
and the equity of current tax policies.228  Although The Report of 
the Tax Fairness Commission in Massachusetts did not directly 
address domicile or residency, it provided guidance with respect 
to the fundamental principles of a sound tax system.229  It 
determined, among other things, that a tax should “be as simple, 
administratively efficient, and cost-effective as possible; and . . . 
be as predictable as possible.”230 
 
 
222.  ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 639–41 (1776). 
223.  Id. 
224.  NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK FOR 
STATE LEGISLATORS (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/TaxPolicyHa 
ndbook3rdEdition.pdf. 
225.  Id. at 4. 
226.  See id. at 5. 
227. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REP. OF TAX FAIRNESS COMM’N 1 (2014), 
https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/TaxFairnessCommissionReport.pdf. 
228.  Id. at 1. 
229.  Id. at 7. 
230.  Id. 
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In 2015, the Minnesota Department of Revenue delivered 
a report to the Minnesota Legislature on its personal income tax 
laws governing residency and domicile.231  The report outlined 
various policy goals for the residency and domicile laws in 
Minnesota: 
 
 Help ensure consistent, transparent, and fair 
treatment of all taxpayers 
 Make it easier for taxpayers to understand 
how residency is determined for taxes 
 Reduce the time and effort needed for 
taxpayers who are selected for a residency 
audit232 
 
Governor Andrew Cuomo established the New York State 
Tax Reform and Fairness Commission in December 2012 to 
conduct a comprehensive and objective review of the State’s tax 
structure, including its corporate, sales, estate and personal 
income taxes.233  The Governor charged the commission with 
developing revenue-neutral policy options to modernize the 
current tax system with the goals of increasing its simplicity, 
fairness, economic competitiveness and affordability.234 
 
B. Application of Tax Policy Principles to Domicile 
Determinations 
 
Combining the concepts discussed by Adam Smith and the 
state tax commissions discussed above, this Part addresses 
certainty, and cost-effectiveness in the administration of the 





231.  MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 1. 
232.  Id. at 10. 
233.  N.Y. STATE TAX REFORM AND FAIRNESS COMM’N, FINAL REP., (2013), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/archive/assets/docum
ents/greenislandandreportandappendicies.pdf. 
234.  Id. at 3. 
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1. Certainty 
 
Adam Smith argued that “[t]he tax which each individual 
is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary.”235  He 
argued the following: 
 
The uncertainty of taxation encourages the 
insolence and favours the corruption of an order of 
men who are naturally unpopular, even where 
they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The 
certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, 
in taxation, a matter of so great importance that 
a very considerable degree of inequality, it 
appears, I believe, from the experience of all 
nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small 
degree of uncertainty.236 
 
The domicile rules of many states begin with the 
proposition that the analysis involves an effort to discern 
subjective intent and no precise definition will uniformly guide 
taxpayers and state taxing authorities in their 
interpretations.237  Such a rocky start dooms states to problems 
with certainty.  When the determination of domicile or the exact 
date that domicile begins or ends is murky, taxpayers lose 
respect for the taxing authorities and the system itself. 
Even if we were to assume that taxpayers could navigate 
the domicile definition, identifying the precise day that the 
change in domicile occurs creates its own problems.  Consider 
the recent wealthy retiree that wishes to move to Florida: The 
retiree purchases a new home in Florida on January 3rd, makes 
some minor renovations on January 14th, lists her home in the 
old domicile for sale on February 2nd, purchases new furniture 
for the Florida home on March 4th, begins to live in the Florida 
home on March 15th, moves some additional furniture to Florida 
on April 1st, signs a contract for sale of the home in the old 
domicile on April 15th, and closes the sale of the former 
 
235.  SMITH, supra note 222, at 639. 
236.  Id. 
237.  See, e.g., MINN. R. 8001.0300 subp. 2 (2019). 
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residence on June 1st.  During this same tax year, retiree’s 
spouse moves to the new Florida home on April 10th, but both 
retiree and her spouse spend time in both locations until June 
1st.  This fact pattern clearly demonstrates an intent to change 
domicile, but when did it occur?  A review of the domicile factors 
in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York provide little 
guidance in our efforts to pinpoint the exact date that the 
taxpayers’ acts create sufficient evidence to prove a domicile 
change.  Instead, practitioners and taxpayers make their best 
guess and collect support for their choices.  If challenged, the 
taxpayer has the burden of proving the domicile change date in 
a system of uncertainty. 
In Minnesota, taxpayer uncertainty became so uncertain 
that the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue listed fourteen 
myths permeating the taxpayer community with respect to 
domicile and residency in that state.238  These myths permeated 
the taxpayer community with respect to the Department of 
Revenue’s analysis of domicile and residency.239  The myths 
generally reflected taxpayer difficulty with the twenty-six factor 
domicile test described in Part II(D) of this Article and fell into 
various categories.  Consistent across several of the identified 
myths, many taxpayers believed that the existence of one 
domicile factor doomed them to residency status.240  One myth 
related to an outdated factor used in the residency 
determination: the location of a bank account in the state.241  
Responding to this myth, the Department of Revenue stated that 
no one factor is determinative and conceded that the use of this 
particular factor has less relevance due to the modernization of 
the banking industry.242  Another myth reflects a paranoia 
running through the tax community:  “Revenue will track where 
my pets are by the microchips that are implanted and use that 
against me if the microchip is registered in Minnesota.”243 
Subsequent to the issuance of the Minnesota Residency 
Report, the legislature amended the statutes to address many of 
 
238.  MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 18. 
239.  Id. 
240.  Id. 
241.  Id. at 18. 
242.  Id. 
243.  Id. 
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these myths and prohibit the consideration of various matters in 
the determination of an individual’s domicile.244  Despite these 
myths and other definitional difficulties in Minnesota, the State 
proposed changes to its domicile factors rather than an 
elimination or substantial modification to the definition of 
resident. 
 
2. Economical Administration 
 
It has been said that “[e]very tax ought to be so contrived 
as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people 
as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public 
treasury of the state.”245  Smith interpreted this last maxim to 
mean that a tax (1) should be capable of economical 
administration, (2) should not “obstruct the industry of the 
people,” (3) should not offer undue opportunities for evasion, and 
(4) should not impose “unnecessary trouble, vexation, and 
oppression” upon the public.246  As described, infra, the ordinary 
domicile audit includes a substantial invasion of privacy, 
considerable document production efforts, and may continue for 
months or more than a year.  Eliminating the subjective 
component and moving to a physical presence test would 
accelerate the pace of the audits rather than create the 
“unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression” in its current 
form. 
Some tax professionals refer to residency audits as “tax 
colonoscopies.”247  This procedure ordinarily begins with the 
mailing of a domicile questionnaire to a targeted taxpayer.248  
The Minnesota Residency Report describes its audit process as 
follows: 
 
 Auditor Notifies Taxpayer of Audit, Requests 
Information 
 
244.  MINN. STAT. § 290.01 subdiv. 7(c) (2018). 
245.  SMITH, supra note 222, at 640. 
246.  Id. 
247.  Residency Audits:  The Curse of Second Homes, WESTVIEW INV. 
ADVISORS, http://www.westviewinvest.com/blog/residency-audits-curse-second 
-homes (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). 
248.  MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 17. 
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 Taxpayer Gathers Information 
 Taxpayer Submits Information 
 Auditor Reviews Information 
 Auditor Requests More Information 
 Taxpayer Gathers and Submits Additional 
Information 
 Auditor Reviews Additional Information, 
Prepares Report 
 Auditor Presents Audit Report to 
Taxpayer/Representative249 
 
On its face, the process seems logical and measured; 
however, revisiting the information requested and its need may 
lead to a different conclusion.  As a starting point, gathering the 
information and reviewing the information takes time.  The 
Minnesota Residency Report grants taxpayers thirty days to 
respond to the initial request and suggests that its auditors 
review that information over the next thirty days.250  Because 
the rules seek information on twenty-six domicile factors, it 
requires little imagination to understand the depth and extent 
of the inquiry.251  Compare this examination to taxpayers facing 
an audit on the “substantial presence test” who merely address 
their days spent in the state and whether they have a permanent 
place of abode in the state.252  If Minnesota truly wanted to 
“reduce the time and effort needed for taxpayers who are 
selected for a residency audit,”253 it need only remove the 
domicile test and rely entirely on the presence test. 
Privacy suffers as auditors raise questions concerning 
family relationships, personal relationships, business 
relationships, travel habits, spending habits, and other personal 
matters.  In a recent audit of this author’s client, the 
Massachusetts Department of Revenue requested and received 
information concerning a taxpayer’s marital relationship, child 
visitation privileges, religious worship habits, parental 
 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. 
251.  MINN. R. 8001.0300 subp. 3 (2019). 
252.  MINN. STAT. § 290.01 subdiv. 7(b) (2018). 
253.  MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 10. 
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relationships, vacation preferences, hobbies, movie preferences, 
credit card spending, and gambling abilities. 
In a California case that truly goes beyond normal behavior 
for both the taxpayer and the Government, Gilbert Hyatt spent 
more than twenty years in various courts fighting a residency 
determination where he produced 220 declarations, affidavits 
from more than 150 witnesses, and thousands of pages of 
contemporaneous documentary evidence.254  In turn, the 
Franchise Tax Board sent more than 100 letters and information 
demands to third parties, including Hyatt’s banks, utility 
companies, newspapers, medical providers, attorneys, and 
business associates.  In addition, the Franchise Tax Board 
conducted interviews and collected signed statements from 
various individuals estranged from Hyatt at the time.255 
Bill Leonard, a member of the California State Board of 
Equalization and a twenty-four year member of the California 
Legislature, provided the following critique of the Franchise Tax 
Board’s conduct: 
 
. . . the FTB investigators crossed many ethical 
lines and demonstrated how tax agents are not 
held to the same legal standards we demand of 
law enforcement officers. Tax agents rummaged 
through his trash without warrants, visited 
business partners and doctors, and shared his 
Social Security Number and other personal 
information with the media. This is outrageous 
behavior and I call on the FTB to rein in their 
agents. What really galled me is the FTB testified 
in open court that this level of harassment was 
only a typical audit. If true, then the storm 
troopers are alive and well at the FTB.256 
 
 
254.  Hearing Summary, Franchise and Income Tax Appeal at 6, In re 
Appeal of Gilbert P. Hyatt, Case No. 435770 (1991). 
255.  Id. at 6–7. 
256.  David Nolte, California Loses Big in Litigation Involving Its Tax 
Jurisdiction and Related Residency Audits, HG.ORG LEGAL RES., 
https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5410 (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). 
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Conclusion 
 
As the states developed their presence laws, many initially 
adopted those laws to supplement, rather than replace, the facts 
and circumstances domicile test of residence.  The historic 
definition of residence as domicile was already on the books and 
deeply embedded in practice and case law.257  The dual definition 
of residence for state income tax purposes gave the states two 
“bites at the apple” to classify an individual as a resident and 
subject the taxpayer to state taxation on her worldwide income. 
Despite the historic application of the domicile test and the 
revenue raising potential, states should abandon the domicile 
concept in favor of an objective standard consistent with tax 
policy maxims.  This would increase cost-effective 
implementation of state law and provide taxpayers and auditors 
with certainty in tax return preparation and examinations. 
In 1984, Congress showed us the way in its move from the 
federal “subjective test” to a “substantial presence test”258 
comparable to the states’ presence tests.  States with both the 
domicile and presence test may object to the elimination of the 
domicile test and the potential loss of revenue.  However, those 
states could address such concerns by adjusting the residency 
test to meet revenue targets.  This adjustment could include 
such changes as removing the permanent place of abode 
requirement or altering the number of days required for 
residency. 
Grateful taxpayers may applaud a test that relies heavily 
on a mere count of days in a state and avoids invasive, time-
consuming inquiries into their personal lives.  Ultimately, a 
move away from the domicile standard would help ensure 
consistent, transparent, and fair treatment of all taxpayers and 
restore confidence in our tax system. 
 
 
257.  See Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 695 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (N.Y. 
1998). 
258.  See supra Part III. 
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